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Abstract 
Respondent incentives are increasingly used as a measure of combating falling response rates and resulting risks of 
nonresponse bias. Nonresponse in panel surveys is particularly problematic, since even low wave-on-wave nonresponse 
rates can lead to substantial cumulative losses; if nonresponse is differential, this may lead to increasing bias across waves. 
Although the effects of incentives have been studied extensively in cross-sectional contexts, little is known about cumulative 
effects across waves of a panel. We provide new evidence about the effects of continued incentive payments on attrition, 
bias and item nonresponse, using data from a large scale, multi-wave, mixed mode incentive experiment on a UK 
government panel survey of young people. In this study, incentives significantly reduced attrition, far outweighing negative 
effects on item response rates in terms of the amount of information collected by the survey per issued case. Incentives had 
proportionate effects on retention rates across a range of respondent characteristics and as a result did not reduce attrition 
bias in terms of those characteristics. The effects of incentives on retention rates were larger for unconditional than 
conditional incentives and larger in postal than telephone mode. Across waves, the effects on attrition decreased somewhat, 
although the effects on item nonresponse and the lack of effect on bias remained constant. The effects of incentives at later 
waves appeared to be independent of incentive treatments and mode of data collection at earlier waves. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Surveys around the world are facing declining response 
rates and, with this, increasing risks of nonresponse bias if 
nonrespondents’ characteristics systematically differ from 
respondents’ characteristics. For panel surveys this is partic-
ularly problematic, since even low nonresponse rates at each 
wave can lead to large cumulative losses. If nonresponse is 
differential, bias could increase with the duration of the 
panel. In order to boost participation rates, survey orga-
nisations increasingly offer respondent incentives. This 
paper provides new evidence on the cumulative effects of 
incentives on attrition, attrition bias and item nonresponse, 
using data from a large scale, multi-wave, mixed mode 
incentive experiment on a UK government panel survey of 
young people.  
The effects of incentives have been studied in many 
settings: monetary incentives increase response more than 
gifts or lotteries (Church 1993; Singer, Hoewyk, Gebler, 
Raghunathan and McGonagle 1999); unconditional incen-
tives (i.e., those incentives that are given at the time of the 
survey request) increase response more than conditional 
incentives (those that are promised in return for participa-
tion) (Church 1993; Goyder 1994; Hopkins and Gullickson 
1992; Singer et al. 1999); response rates increase with the 
value of the incentive (Armstrong 1975; Church 1993; Fox, 
Crask and Kim 1988; Hopkins and Gullickson 1992; 
Rodgers 2002; Yu and Cooper 1983); incentives have larger 
effects in studies with low response rates and larger effects 
in postal than interviewer administered surveys (Singer 
et al. 1999). Most evidence of differences between modes in 
the effect of incentives, however, stems from comparisons 
of separate studies and fails to control for differences in 
other measures affecting response. As a result, differences in 
the effects of incentives are not necessarily genuine mode 
effects. The study by Ryu, Couper and Marans (2006) is an 
exception. The authors compared the effects of monetary 
incentives and gifts in a mixed mode postal and face-to-face 
survey. Their study did not, however, include a no-incentive 
condition and so did not allow an evaluation of the 
magnitude of incentive effects across modes. We compared 
the effects of incentives in a mixed postal and computer-
assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) survey and, in 
postal mode, also examined the effects of conditional and 
unconditional incentives. 
Research on the effects of incentives has focused on 
response rates and little is known about the effects on bias, 
the ultimate reason for concern about low response. 
Incentive studies are mostly limited to studying effects on 
bias in sample composition and some studies have found 
that incentives disproportionately increase participation of 
respondents typically under-represented, for example those 
with low education (Singer, Van Hoewyk and Maher 2000), 
poor (James 1997), black or poor (Mack, Huggins, Keathley 
and Sundukchi 1998), of black or Indian minority ethnic 
groups, living in larger households or households with de-
pendent children, aged 0-20, or single (Stratford, Simmonds 
and Nicolaas 2003). Biases in sample composition are 
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however not necessarily correlated with biases in important 
survey estimates, especially since typically only a handful of 
compositional characteristics are studied. Ultimately, studies 
of nonresponse bias are limited by the lack of information 
about nonrespondents, a limitation which can be overcome 
to some extent by panel studies, where information about 
nonrespondents is available from waves prior to the 
dropout. We estimate the extent of bias due to attrition in 
terms of sample composition and survey variables. We then 
assess the effectiveness of incentives at reducing bias, 
exploiting the information on attriters available from the 
panel. 
Additionally, little is known about the effects of 
incentives over waves of a panel survey, whether the same 
treatment is administered repeatedly or whether the 
treatment changes between waves. In a review of the use of 
incentives in longitudinal studies, Laurie and Lynn (in 
press) concluded that, given the cost implications of 
changing incentive conditions, there was surprisingly little 
evidence about the longer term effects of such changes to 
guide survey practitioners. Quoting an internal memo-
randum of the US Census Bureau, Ward, Boggess, Selvavel 
and McMahon (2001) wrote (see page 2) that a “review of 
the well-known longitudinal studies (Downs 1999) found 
that all non-Census Bureau studies used a monetary 
incentive during each wave, but there had been no scientific 
tests to determine the effectiveness of the incentives”. If 
attrition leads to dropout of the least co-operative, the 
sample might increasingly be composed of committed 
respondents who are less responsive to incentives, because 
they are sufficiently motivated to participate even without 
the incentive (Laurie and Lynn in press). In this case, 
incentives may have decreasing marginal effects on 
response rates over the life of the panel. By the same token, 
incentives may have increasing effects on attrition bias, if 
they have disproportionate effect on sample members who 
would otherwise be more likely to drop out. Although some 
incentive studies have been carried out in the context of 
panels, they mostly only covered one wave, or examined the 
effect of changes in incentive treatment from one wave to 
the next. Martin, Abreu and Winters (2001) and Ward et al. 
(2001), for example, studied the effects of incentives on 
conversion rates of previous wave nonrespondents; Rodgers 
(2002) and Laurie (2007) examined the effects of changes in 
incentive values in a panel. The only studies which 
examined the effects of incentives over more than two 
waves appear to be those by James (1997), Mack, Huggins, 
Keathley and Sundukchi (1998) and Laurie and Lynn (in 
press), who reported that the positive effect of an incentive 
paid early in a panel persisted for several waves even 
without repeated incentive payment. These studies, 
however, only examined the effect of an incentive paid in a 
single wave and did not examine the cumulative effects of 
incentives offered over successive waves. We examine the 
cumulative effects of continued incentive payments across 
three waves spanning a time frame of three years, as well as 
the effects of changes from telephone to postal mode and 
from conditional to unconditional incentive treatment.  
Finally, there is conflicting evidence in the literature 
about the effects of incentives on data quality. Although 
concern is frequently voiced that incentives may lead to 
lower data quality, by marginally increasing the motivation 
of respondents who would otherwise have dropped out of 
the study and are not sufficiently able or motivated to 
respond diligently, existing studies have either found that 
incentives lead to improved respondent effort and less item 
nonresponse (James and Bolstein 1990; Mack et al. 1998; 
Singer et al. 2000), or have found no relationship (Berk, 
Mathiowetz, Ward and White 1987; Davern, Rockwood, 
Sherrod and Campbell 2003; Goyder 1994; Shettle and 
Mooney 1999; Singer et al. 1999; Teisl, Roe and Vayda 
2005; Tzamourani and Lynn 1999; Willimack, Schuman, 
Pennell and Lepkowski 1995). Item nonresponse is poten-
tially critical, because analysts typically only use cases with 
complete data. This leads to losses in efficiency due to 
reductions in sample sizes and, similar to unit nonresponse, 
can lead to biased estimates and invalid inference if item 
nonrespondents are not a random subset of the sample 
(Mason, Lesser and Traugott 2002). Problems of item 
nonresponse increase for multivariate analysis, if the 
patterns of missingness vary across items, and for analysis 
of change, which in addition depends on complete infor-
mation at different points in time. Since incentives may 
affect both unit and item nonresponse, it is then not clear 
what their net effect may be on repeated measures derived 
from a panel study. We examined the effect of incentives on 
item nonresponse rates and calculated their net effect on 
attrition and item response. 
 
2. Hypotheses tested  
The outcomes measured for this analysis were the 
attrition rate, item nonresponse rate and attrition bias. 
Attrition was an absorbing state, since the survey did not re-
issue nonrespondents at later waves. Item nonresponse was 
measured as the number of non-filtered items missing, either 
due to refusals or ‘don’t know’ answers. (Non-filtered items 
are those which apply to all sample members: items for 
which eligibility is determined by the response to an earlier 
question are excluded from our measure of item non-
response.) Attrition bias was measured in terms of socio-
demographic characteristics and wave 1 survey measures. 
These three outcome measures were used to test the 
following: 
Survey Methodology, June 2008 107 
 
 
Statistics Canada, Catalogue No. 12-001-X 
H1: Effects of incentives on attrition, item nonresponse and 
attrition bias.  
In previous studies incentives have generally increased 
response rates, be it because norms of social exchange 
oblige the respondent to return a “favour” (norm of 
reciprocity, Gouldner 1960) or because the incentive 
substitutes for a lack of motivation to participate for 
other reasons, such as civic duty or topic interest 
(leverage-salience theory, Groves, Singer and Corning 
2000). Incentives may in addition motivate respon-
dents to provide better quality responses, reducing item 
nonresponse. At the same time incentives may change 
the sample composition to include more respondents 
who are not diligent about answering the survey 
questions, and as a result increase item nonresponse. 
Finally, incentives may have differential effects on 
attrition across sample members. Those with a high 
propensity to participate in the survey without the 
incentive may be less likely to be affected by 
incentives, while those more likely to drop out of the 
survey may be more susceptible. As a result, incentives 
may reduce attrition bias. 
Null hypothesis H1: Incentives have no effect on 
attrition, item nonresponse or attrition bias. 
 
H2: Effects of incentives across waves.  
The effect of incentives in increasing unit and item 
response rates may weaken across waves, if attrition 
leads to dropout of the least motivated sample mem-
bers and the remaining members are sufficiently moti-
vated to participate for other reasons and hence less 
susceptible to incentives (Laurie and Lynn in press). 
However, the extent to which incentives reduce non-
response bias could increase over waves, if incentives 
disproportionately retain those in the sample who are 
most likely to otherwise drop out.  
 Null hypothesis H2: The effects of incentives do not 
change across waves. 
 
H3: Effects of unconditional and conditional incentives in a 
panel context.  
Previous studies, carried out on cross-sectional sur-
veys, suggest that unconditional incentives have larger 
effects on unit nonresponse, possibly because the pre-
payment signals that the survey organisation trusts the 
sample member will participate, reinforcing the norm 
of reciprocity. Whether the different incentive condi-
tions have different effects on item nonresponse is not 
clear.  
 Null hypothesis H3: Unconditional and conditional 
incentives have similar effects in a panel context. 
 
H4: Effects of incentives in postal and telephone mode.  
Comparisons of previous studies suggest that incen-
tives have a larger effect in postal mode, possibly 
because in telephone mode the interviewer already 
functions as an external motivator to increase both unit 
and item response (Singer et al. 1999) and the scope 
for additional improvements is smaller. The same may 
not necessarily be true in a panel context where the 
effect of mode on response may be mediated by the 
respondent’s experience of previous waves. 
 Null hypothesis H4: Incentives have similar effects in 
postal and telephone mode. 
 
H5: Effects of changes over waves in mode or incentive 
treatment.  
Compared to sample members allocated to the same 
mode and treatment across waves, those who were 
allocated to different treatments or different modes 
may differ in their experiences of previous survey 
waves and their expectations about future waves. As a 
result, the effect of incentives may not only be 
conditional on mode at the current wave, but may be 
influenced by the incentive treatment and mode in 
previous waves. 
 Null hypothesis H5: Changes in mode or incentive 
treatment over waves do not have lasting effects. 
 
H6: Effects of incentives across ability levels.  
Sample members with low education levels are typi-
cally more likely to drop out of surveys. If incentives 
reduce attrition bias, they should therefore dispropor-
tionately reduce attrition among lower achievers. Low 
ability respondents may at the same time be more 
likely to provide incomplete responses, if they find the 
task of completing the postal questionnaire more 
difficult. Therefore, incentives may increase mean 
levels of item nonresponse. 
 Null hypothesis H6: Incentives have similar effects 
across ability levels. 
 
3. Study design  
The Youth Cohort Study of England and Wales (YCS) 
investigates transitions from compulsory education to 
further or higher education or the labour market and 
typically samples cohorts of 16 to 17 year-olds every two 
years, who are surveyed on several occasions at annual 
intervals. The incentives experiment was embedded in 
waves 2, 3 and 4 of cohort 10. The survey is managed and 
funded by the Department for Children, Schools and 
Families, who jointly designed the incentive experiment 
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with the National Centre for Social Research, the survey 
contractors for waves 2 and 3 of YCS cohort 10. 
 
3.1 The survey 
 
The population studied in the YCS cohort 10 consisted of 
pupils in England and Wales who had reached minimum 
school leaving age of 16 in the 1998/1999 school year 
(Russell and Phelps 2001), that is, a one year age cohort of 
pupils born between 1-9-1982 and 31-8-1983. A 10% 
random sample was drawn from the registers of schools 
(excluding special schools and schools with fewer than 20 
pupils of that age) in 1999, by asking schools to provide the 
names and addresses of pupils born on the 5
th
, 15
th
 and 25
th
 
of every month. From the resulting file of 31,424 names and 
addresses a systematic random sample of 25,000 pupils was 
drawn. The first wave of the survey took place a year later 
in spring 2000, the second at the end of 2000, the third in 
spring 2002 and the fourth in spring 2003. Nonrespondents 
were not issued in subsequent waves and, as a result, 
attrition was monotonic.  
Wave 1 was a postal survey with telephone follow-up    
of nonrespondents after 4 mailings (initial questionnaire 
mailing and three reminders). Based on reported exami-
nation results, wave 1 respondents were classified as either 
‘higher achievers’ (if they had obtained 5 General Certif-
icate of Secondary Education examination passes at grades 
A* to C) or ‘lower achievers’ otherwise. This led to around 
one-third of wave 1 respondents being classified as lower 
achievers. At wave 2 roughly one third of issued sample 
members were randomly selected for additional questions 
on particular topics and assigned to computer assisted 
telephone interviewing (CATI). In addition to the core 
questionnaire, telephone respondents were administered a 
module on decisions about entering higher education (for 
higher achievers) or on educational and employment 
aspirations (for lower achievers). The remaining sample 
members were administered the core questionnaires by post. 
At wave 3 all lower achievers received the core mail 
questionnaire, although the telephone module continued to 
be carried for a third of higher achievers. At wave 4 all 
respondents were assigned to the core postal survey. Figure 
1 illustrates the allocation to modes and incentives. 
The core questionnaire remained mainly unchanged for 
the three experimental waves. Telephone respondents were 
asked the core questions before the additional modules. The 
core questionnaire was the same as the postal questionnaire, 
although some items were adapted for administration over 
the telephone. The average telephone interview took around 
20 minutes. (The questionnaires and technical reports are 
available via the UK Data Archive in the appendices of the 
YCS User Guide at http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/ 
findingdata/snDescription.asp?sn=4571&key=YCS.) 
 
3.2 The incentives experiment 
 
Facing growing concerns over declining response rates, 
an experiment was introduced in the second wave of cohort 
10, to study the effect of incentive payments on response 
rates and nonresponse bias. A proportion of wave 1 
respondents on both the postal and telephone surveys were 
sent a GBP5 voucher (approx. USD10 or EUR7), while the 
control groups received no such incentive. Additionally, in 
the postal survey the incentives were either unconditional 
(the incentive was sent with the initial mailing) or 
conditional (the voucher was promised in the original 
mailing, but only sent on receipt of a completed 
questionnaire). At waves 3 and 4, all incentives were paid 
unconditionally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wave 1 
Postal core questionnaire. Reported exam results used to classify respondents for wave 2 
allocation. 
 Higher Achievers Lower Achievers 
Wave 2 Tx Tu Px Pu Pc Tx Tu Px Pu Pc 
Wave 3 Tx Tu Px Pu -- -- -- Px Pu -- 
Wave 4 -- -- Px Pu -- -- -- Px Pu -- 
Questionnaire Core + Higher 
education 
Core Core + Education 
and employment 
Core 
Notes: T = telephone, P = postal, x = control, u = unconditional incentive, c = conditional incentive. Arrows 
indicate changes in incentive treatment or mode allocation between waves. 
Figure 1 Experimental design 
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3.3 Allocation of respondents to modes and incentive 
treatments  
At wave 2, wave 1 respondents were randomly assigned 
to either telephone or postal mode. The allocation of 
incentive treatments was however done at the school level 
(randomised cluster assignment by mode). Each school 
represented in the sample was allocated to one telephone 
treatment (control or incentive) and independently allocated 
to one, potentially different, postal treatment (control, 
unconditional incentive or conditional incentive), so that all 
sample members from the same school approached in the 
same mode received the same incentive treatment. 
The 4,712 wave 1 lower achiever respondents were 
stratified by identification number within school within 
Government Office Region and alternately allocated to 
telephone and postal treatments. We have excluded from the 
analysis 627 cases for which there was no valid telephone 
number on file, as those amongst this group who had been 
allocated to telephone mode were approached by post. 
Consequently, analysis of lower achievers is restricted to 
2,097 approached by telephone and 1,988 approached by 
post.  
A similar procedure was carried out for higher achievers, 
except that a larger proportion was allocated to postal 
treatment. There were 8,909 wave 1 higher achiever 
respondents of which 751 had no valid telephone number 
and are excluded from the analysis. After these exclusions 
there are 2,922 higher achievers allocated to telephone mode 
and 5,236 allocated to postal mode. 
For the allocation of schools to incentive treatment 
groups, the schools containing telephone sample members 
(i.e. all schools apart from a few of the very smallest schools 
with fewer than five pupils in the sample) were stratified 
according to the ratio of lower to higher achievers in the 
sample and randomly assigned to incentive treatments 
within strata. (The proportion of schools assigned to 
incentives was 1/2 if the ratio of lower to higher achievers in 
the sample was ≥ 2; 1/3 for 1/2 ≤ ratio < 2 and 1/4 for all 
remaining schools.) The procedure was repeated for the 
allocation of schools in the postal treatment groups, where 
those selected for incentive treatment were randomly split 
into a conditional and an unconditional treatment group. 
(The proportions allocated to incentives were 2/3 if the ratio 
was ≥ 2; 1/3 for 0 ≤ ratio < 1/2 and 1/6 for all other schools.) 
All estimates of significance presented in this text account 
for the clustered sampling design of the incentive 
experiment.  
Table 1 shows the issued sample sizes at each wave for 
the different treatment and mode combinations, excluding 
cases of known ineligibility who had either moved abroad 
or died (n = 13 at wave 2; n = 3 at wave 3). Ineligible cases 
at wave 4 are not identified in the data, but the number is 
likely to be small. The analysis also excludes wave 1 
respondents for whom no telephone number was known at 
the time of the allocation to modes for wave 2, as described 
above, and 117 higher achievers assigned to telephone mode 
at wave 2, who responded by post and were subsequently 
allocated to postal mode. 
Table 1 also documents the observed wave-on-wave and 
cumulative response rates (AAPOR RR1). The rates are 
shown by achievement level and sequential mode/incentive 
combination. Wave-on-wave response rates for the higher 
achiever sample allocated to telephone control at wave 2 
and moved to postal control at wave 4 (Col 1) were, for 
example, 76.82%, 69.13% and 72.21%. The issued numbers 
of cases declined from 2,075 to 1,101 across the three 
waves, because nonrespondents were not issued in 
subsequent waves.  
 
 
Table 1 Conditional and cumulative response rates 
 
  Higher Achievers Lower Achievers 
Wave 
Response 
Rate % 
TxTxPx TuTuPu PxPxPx PuPuPu PcPuPu TxPxPx TuPuPu PxPxPx PuPuPu PcPuPu 
2 Conditional 76.82 80.91 78.23 86.45 82.32 65.21 70.41 64.93 75.00 71.35 
 (Issued n) (2,075) (728) (3,262) (1,004) (967) (1,282) (811) (807) (608) (569) 
3 Conditional 69.13 73.17 73.07 81.91 81.36 59.09 70.93 63.36 71.93 70.20 
 (Issued n) (1,594) (589) (2,551) (868) (794) (836) (571) (524) (456) (406) 
 Cumulative 53.11 59.20 57.16 70.82 66.94 38.53 49.94 41.14 53.95 50.09 
4 Conditional 72.21 85.61 76.11 85.65 86.82 63.16 74.26 65.36 75.30 81.34 
 (Issued n) (1,101) (431) (1,863) (711) (645) (494) (404) (332) (328) (284) 
 Cumulative 38.31 50.69 43.48 60.66 58.03 24.34 36.99 26.89 40.63 40.60 
Notes: AAPOR Response Rate 1. Treatment groups are identified by T = telephone, P = postal, x = control, u = unconditional incentive, 
c = conditional incentive. Tx Tx Px for example, refers to the sample allocated to telephone control at waves 2 and 3 and to postal control at 
wave 4. Conditional response rates are conditional on response at the previous wave. The base is the number of issued cases, which 
excludes previous wave nonrespondents and ineligible cases. Cumulative response rates are the percentage of wave 1 respondents 
remaining in the respondent sample. The base is the wave 2 number of issued cases, excluding three higher achievers ineligible at wave 3 
(1 Px Px Px and 2 Pc Pu Pu).  
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4. Outcome measures and methods  
 
The analysis is based on the sample of wave 1 
respondents, since allocation to experimental treatments 
used information collected in the first wave and the 
corresponding characteristics of wave 1 nonrespondents are 
unknown. Our focus is therefore on attrition, conditional 
upon wave 1 response. This is the aspect of non-response 
that is particular to panel surveys, though of course it must 
be recognised that the characteristics of attrition are 
conditional on the characteristics of wave 1 response. The 
response rate at wave 1 (AAPOR RR1) was 54.80%, 
excluding 5 cases of known ineligibility (Russell and Phelps 
2001). This section describes the outcome measures and 
methods used to evaluate the hypotheses about the effects of 
incentives.  
 
4.1 Attrition  
To test the effect of incentives on attrition, we estimated 
the probability of attrition as a function of the experimental 
design variables (telephone mode, unconditional incentives, 
conditional incentives, lower achievers) and their 
interactions. For each of the three experimental waves 
(t = 2, 3, 4), we estimated a separate probit model of the 
probability of attrition, in each case using the wave 1 
respondent sample as the base: 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8
9
Pr( ) (
* *
* *
* * )
it t t i t i t i
t i t i i t i i
t i i t i i
t i i i i
attrition F tel unc cond
la tel unc la tel
la unc la cond
la tel unc
= β +β + β +β
+ β + β + β
+ β + β
+ β + ε  (1)
 
where F is the probit link function. The estimated 
coefficients and standard errors from this model were then 
used to calculate predicted probabilities of attrition under 
different treatment conditions and to test for differences due 
to incentives. 
 
4.2 Item nonresponse  
To test the effect of incentives on item nonresponse, we 
estimated count models of the number of items missing, 
using all non-filtered items from the core questionnaires in 
waves 2 (n = 44), 3 (n = 48) and 4 (n = 46), where ‘don’t 
know’ was counted as a missing value. We used the same 
specification of the predictors as for model (1) to estimate 
separate negative binomial regression models for each of the 
three experimental waves, conditional on response to the 
given wave. (Overdispersion meant that Poisson models did 
not fit the data: the P-value of the Likelihood Ratio test of 
equal mean and variance was 0.0000 for all three waves.) 
The estimated coefficients and standard errors from these 
models were used to calculate predicted item nonresponse 
under different treatment conditions and to test for 
differences due to incentives. 
 
4.3 Attrition bias  
To test the effect of incentives on attrition bias, we 
estimated the probability of attrition using model (1) but 
including wave 1 respondent characteristics and their 
interactions with the experimental design variables as 
predictors. We estimated separate probit models for attrition 
at each of the experimental waves (t = 2, 3, 4) and for each 
characteristic, again using the wave 1 respondent sample as 
the base: 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8
9 10
11
19
Pr( ) (
* *
* *
* * 1
1 * ...
1 * * * )
it t t i t i t i
t i t i i t i i
t i i t i i
t i i i
i i
i i i i i
attrition F tel unc cond
la tel unc la tel
la unc la cond
la tel unc w char
w char tel
w char la tel unc
= β +β + β +β
+ β + β + β
+ β + β
+ β + β
+ β +
+ β + ε
 
(2)
 
where 11β  to 19β  are the coefficients for the interactions of 
the characteristic with the design variables. The coefficient 
for the respondent characteristic, 10,β  provides information 
about the direction, magnitude and, in combination with its 
standard error, the significance of attrition bias for the 
postal, no incentive, higher achiever reference group. The 
interaction of the characteristic and the incentive indicators 
provide information about the change in attrition bias due to 
incentives. The significance of all interactions presented in 
this text was calculated following recommendations for 
nonlinear models by Norton, Wang and Ai (2004) using the 
command ‘predictnl’ in Stata version 9. 
The characteristics tested were gender, school type, exam 
results, current activity (full-time education, employment, 
not in education, employment or training (“neet”)), 
experience of unemployment, studying for vocational or 
academic qualifications, household composition (living with 
parent, partner, neither) and a set of attitudinal questions 
about employment and training. The wording of all 
questions is documented in Table 6. The characteristics 
chosen were those for which respondents and non-
respondents could be expected to differ, based on previous 
studies of nonresponse in the YCS and other surveys and on 
nonresponse theories (Groves and Couper 1998; Lynn, 
Purdon, Hedges and McAleese 1994).  
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4.4 Reported results 
 
Since coefficients from non-linear models cannot be 
interpreted substantively (Long 1997), we report predicted 
values based on the model estimates, rather than coeffi-
cients. Unless stated otherwise, the results are for the higher 
achiever group. To convey a sense of the magnitude of 
differences in outcomes across treatments, we report 
transformations of the predicted values, comparing each 
treatment with the comparison group, the higher achiever 
postal control.  
 
5. Attrition, item nonresponse and attrition  
        bias in the control groups 
 
As a background to the evaluation of the effects of 
incentives, this section documents the extent of attrition, 
item nonresponse and attrition bias in the control groups, 
highlighting differences across waves, achievement levels 
and modes. Throughout the discussion the higher achiever 
postal no-incentive group is the reference category, with 
which all other treatments are compared. 
 
5.1 Attrition 
 
The predicted cumulative attrition rate among higher 
achievers allocated to the postal control group, increased 
from 21.77% in wave 2 to 56.53% in wave 4 (Table 2, Col 
1). For lower achievers (Col 2), attrition rates in the postal 
control group were 61% higher at wave 2, but this 
difference decreased across waves to 29% at wave 4. The 
difference by achievement level was nonetheless significant 
in all three waves (P-value of 4β  = 0.0000 for t = 2, 3, 4). In 
telephone mode (Col 3), attrition rates in the control group 
were not significantly different at wave 2, but 9% higher at 
wave 3 (P-value of 5β  = 0.0034 for t = 3). This is contrary 
to findings from other studies, where nonresponse is 
generally lower in telephone mode due to the role of the 
interviewer in persuading respondents to take part in the 
survey. One possible reason for finding the opposite in this 
study is that for both the postal and CATI treatment groups, 
further attempts to obtain responses from initial non-
respondents were made by telephone, so that only the postal 
group had a multi-mode treatment. Secondly, the burden of 
the wave 2 survey (measured by the interview length) was 
higher for the telephone respondents due to the additional 
modules, possibly leading to higher nonresponse at wave 3 
than among the postal sample. The predicted cumulative 
response rates, which were the base for the calculation of 
percentage differences across treatment groups, are docu-
mented in the first three columns of Table 5.    
5.2 Item nonresponse  
The predicted number of missing items in the higher 
achiever postal control group was 2.89 at wave 2, falling to 
1.75 at wave 4 (Table 3, Col 1). For lower achievers (Col. 
2), the expected count for the control group was 21% higher 
at wave 2, with the gap increasing to 45% at wave 4. The 
differences by achievement level were significant in all 
three waves (P ≤  0.0001 for 4,β  t = 2, 3, 4). For telephone 
mode (Col 3), the predicted count was 4% lower at wave 2 
and 12% lower at wave 3 (P = 0.0000 for 5,β  t = 2, 3), 
compared with postal mode. The predicted item non-
response counts, used as the base for the calculations 
presented in Table 3, are documented in columns 4 to 6 of 
Table 5. 
 
5.3 Attrition bias 
 
Nonresponse in the higher achiever postal control group 
was differential for all of the domains tested (Table 4). The 
respondent samples significantly over-represented those 
living with their parents, in full-time education or studying 
for academic qualifications. Predicted attrition rates for 
those in full-time education in the higher achiever postal 
control group, for example, were 14% lower than for those 
not in full-time education at wave 2, with the difference 
increasing to 17% by wave 4 (P = 0.0000 for 10,β  t = 
2, 3, 4). At the same time, the respondent samples under-
represented males, those in secondary modern schools, with 
low or no exam results, who thought employers did not give 
young people the right training and that making plans for 
the future was a waste of time, those in full-time employ-
ment, those who had experienced unemployment and those 
who were studying for vocational qualifications. Bias was 
particularly strong with respect to qualifications. Those 
without any or with very low exam qualifications were 
around 50% more likely to have attrited from the sample by 
waves 3 and 4, compared to sample members with better 
qualifications. Similarly, those in full-time employment 
were 17% more likely than those not in employment (most 
of whom were still in education) to drop out at wave 2, with 
the difference increasing to 22% by wave 4. 
Including background information used by the YCS for 
weighting (gender, school type, exam results and region) in 
the models did not affect the bias for any of the charac-
teristics (in each wave and for each item, the P-value > 0.05 
from Wald tests of the equality of 10β  estimated with and 
without background characteristics; not reported), except for 
bias with respect to qualifications, which was somewhat 
reduced when the background information was included.  
The extent of attrition bias was mostly stable across 
waves, except for a few characteristics. In the higher 
achiever postal control sample, the under-representation of 
males significantly increased from waves 2 to 4 (P-value 
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from a Wald test of the equality of 10β  across the two 
waves = 0.0295; not reported). For some of the other 
characteristics, the bias significantly decreased across 
waves. Nonresponse bias associated with attending a 
modern school fell between waves 3 and 4 and bias 
associated with not having any qualifications fell between 
waves 2 and 3 and again between waves 3 and 4.  
For lower achievers there were few differences in the 
extent of attrition bias (not reported). Bias by gender, that is 
the difference in predicted nonresponse rates between males 
and females, was 12% less than for higher achievers at wave 
4 (P-value of the interaction between achievement level and 
gender was 0.0425 for t = 4), and bias by full-time 
employment was 4% less at wave 2 (P-value = 0.0269 for 
t = 2); bias according to attitudes on training provided by 
employers was 9% higher at wave 2 (P-value = 0.0056); 
bias according to whether studying for academic or 
vocational qualifications was higher at wave 2 (22% and 
13%), 6% lower and 1% higher at wave 3, and lower at 
wave 4 (81% and 92%).  
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Effect of incentives on attrition rates 
 
 Control groups Incentives Incentives by ability Incentives by mode and ability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Wave haxP  
la ha
x x
ha
x
P - P
P
 
ha ha
x x
ha
x
T - P
P
 
ha ha
u x
ha
x
P - P
P
 
( )
(4)
ha ha ha
c x x
ha
P - P /P  (4)
(4)
la
ha
 ( )
( )
la la la
c x x
ha ha ha
c x x
P - P /P
P - P /P
 ( )
(4)
ha ha ha
u x x
ha
T -T /T  ( )
( )
la la la
u x x
ha ha ha
u x x
T -T /T
T -T /T
 
2 21.77 0.6112 0.0650 -0.3777 0.4966 0.7602 0.9763 0.4669 0.8471 
(P-Value)  (0.0000) (0.2268) (0.0000) (0.0142) (0.5085) (0.4332) (0.0556) (0.6810) 
3 42.86 0.3734 0.0941 -0.3191 0.7066 0.6820 0.6743 0.4074 1.4275 
(P-Value)  (0.0000) (0.0034) (0.0000) (0.0592) (0.7834) (0.8287) (0.0057) (0.0861) 
4 56.53 0.2933 - -0.3040 0.8402 0.6179 0.7340 0.6597 0.8338 
(P-Value)  (0.0000) - (0.0000) (0.2244) (0.2535) (0.8177) (0.0911) (0.9265) 
Notes: P = postal, T = telephone, x = control, u = unconditional incentive, c = conditional incentive, ha = higher achievers, la = lower 
achievers. Column (1) shows the predicted attrition rate for the postal control higher achiever sample. The remaining columns show 
proportionate change in predicted rates. P-values of columns 2-4 represent standard errors of the main effects in the probit model; 
column 5 represents P-values from a Wald test of the equality of the coefficients for conditional and unconditional incentives; columns 
7-9 represent P-values for the relevant interactions calculated using ‘predictnl’ in Stata version 9, according to Norton et al. (2004).  
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Effect of incentives on item nonresponse (counts) 
 
 Control groups Incentives Incentives by ability Incentives by mode and ability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Wave haxP  
la ha
x x
ha
x
P - P
P
 
ha ha
x x
ha
x
T - P
P
 
ha ha
u x
ha
x
P - P
P
 
( )
(4)
ha ha ha
c x x
ha
P - P /P  (4)
(4)
la
ha
 ( )
( )
la la la
c x x
ha ha ha
c x x
P - P /P
P - P /P
 ( )
(4)
ha ha ha
u x x
ha
T -T /T  ( )
( )
la la la
u x x
ha ha ha
u x x
T -T /T
T -T /T
 
2 2.89 0.2068 -0.9579 0.1008 1.3849 2.4825 0.6927 0.1820 -0.4094 
(P-Value)  (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0173) (0.4790) (0.1308) (0.6472) (0.6251) (0.9202) 
3 2.54 0.3879 -0.8828 0.1660 1.5599 1.6788 1.2445 -0.9526 -0.1378 
(P-Value)  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0049) (0.2372) (0.4339) (0.6796) (0.0442) (0.3890) 
4 1.75 0.4533 - 0.0085 17.5491 16.8405 0.4621 13.8706 2.3073 
(P-Value)  (0.0013) - (0.9262) (0.2133) (0.4724) (0.6481) (0.5049) (0.4530) 
Notes: P = postal, T = telephone, x = control, u = unconditional incentive, c = conditional incentive, ha = higher achievers, 
la = lower achievers. Column (1) shows the predicted number of missing items of 44 non-branched items at wave 2, 48 at wave 3 
and 46 at wave 4. The remaining columns show proportionate change in predicted item nonresponse counts. P-values of columns 
2-4 represent standard errors of the exponentiated coefficients from the count model; column 5 represents P-values from a Wald 
test of the equality of the exponentiated coefficients for conditional and unconditional incentives; columns 7-9 represent P-values 
for the relevant interactions calculated using’predictnl’ in Stata version 9, according to Norton et al.(2004).  
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Table 4 Attrition bias (higher achiever postal control group) 
 
 Wave 2 P-Value Wave 3 P-Value Wave 4 P-Value 
Male 0.0807 (0.0000) 0.1330 (0.0000) 0.1474 (0.0000) 
School type       
Comprehensive 16 0.0196 (0.2645) 0.0102 (0.6178) 0.0259 (0.2060) 
Comprehensive 18 -0.0197 (0.1966) -0.0138 (0.4444) -0.0200 (0.2650) 
Selective -0.0188 (0.3661) -0.0547 (0.0407) -0.0213 (0.4577) 
Modern 0.2310 (0.0001) 0.2423 (0.0004) 0.1597 (0.0261) 
Independent -0.0142 (0.4639) 0.0147 (0.5245) -0.0068 (0.7756) 
Exam results       
5+ grades A-C -0.0977 (0.1778) -0.0866 (0.3060) -0.1795 (0.0320) 
1-4 grades A-C 0.0831 (0.2857) 0.0721 (0.4298) 0.1696 (0.0606) 
5+ grades D-G 0.0324 (0.8769) 0.0715 (0.7739) 0.1849 (0.4536) 
1-4 grades D-G -0.2177 (0.0000) 0.5714 (0.0000) 0.4347 (0.0000) 
None 0.7826 (0.0000) 0.5716 (0.0000) 0.4348 (0.0000) 
Attitudes        
Employers don’t give training 0.0842 (0.0000) 0.0882 (0.0000) 0.0798 (0.0001) 
Training more important than pay 0.0108 (0.4808) -0.0070 (0.6979) -0.0062 (0.7370) 
Plans for future are a waste of time 0.0656 (0.0959) 0.1457 (0.0015) 0.1371 (0.0030) 
Information about opportunities 0.0034 (0.8431) -0.0204 (0.3266) -0.0236 (0.2549) 
Enough support planning future 0.0063 (0.6771) 0.0043 (0.8233) -0.0105 (0.5848) 
Current activity       
In full-time education -0.1371 (0.0000) -0.1462 (0.0000) -0.1728 (0.0000) 
In full-time employment 0.1661 (0.0003) 0.1983 (0.0001) 0.2201 (0.0000) 
Neither in employment, education or training 0.0898 (0.1387) 0.1036 (0.1495) 0.1098 (0.1184) 
ILO unemployed 0.0112 (0.6272) 0.0573 (0.0421) 0.0475 (0.0879) 
Unemployed during past 12 months 0.0246 (0.4216) 0.0731 (0.0523) 0.0891 (0.0146) 
Studying for academic qualifications -0.1173 (0.0000) -0.1351 (0.0000) -0.1341 (0.0000) 
Studying for vocational qualifications 0.0677 (0.0001) 0.0882 (0.0000) 0.0721 (0.0003) 
Living arrangements       
Living with parent -0.1348 (0.0111) -0.1916 (0.0027) -0.1033 (0.0986) 
Living with partner 0.0904 (0.4457) -0.0441 (0.7475) -0.1042 (0.4525) 
 
Notes: Predicted differences in attrition rates based on 10,
ˆ ,tβ  i.e., prediction for each category compared to all residual categories. Each 
table entry is from a different model as explained in the text. P-values based upon estimated standard errors of the coefficient for the 
characteristic in the probit model. 
 
 
 
Attrition bias in telephone mode was no different from 
postal mode, except for differential nonresponse by gender: 
the bias was 7% less at wave 2, 2% less at wave 3 and 1% 
more at wave 4 (P-value of the interaction between tele-
phone mode and gender was ≤ 0.002 for t = 2, 3, 4). 
 
6. Evaluation of hypotheses 
 
The evidence discussed here is summarised in Table 2 
(effects of incentives on attrition), Table 3 (effects on item 
nonresponse), Table 4 (effects on attrition bias) and Table 5 
(net effect on unit and item nonresponse).    
H1: Effects of incentives on attrition rate, attrition bias and 
item nonresponse. 
Incentives reduced attrition and increased item non-
response but did not impact on attrition bias. Un-
conditional incentives reduced cumulative attrition in 
the postal higher achiever sample (Table 2, Col 4) by 
38% (corresponding to an 8 percentage point dif-
ference) at wave 2, 32% at wave 3 and 30% at wave 4 
(P-value of 2β  = 0.0000 for t = 2, 3, 4). At the same 
time, the incentive increased item nonresponse by 10% 
at wave 2 and 17% at wave 3 (P-value of 2 0.05β ≤  
for t = 2, 3), but had no effect at wave 4 (Table 3, Col 
4). The difference across waves was however not 
significant (see H2).  
Incentives had a proportionate effect on attrition across 
all respondent characteristics tested and therefore did 
not reduce attrition bias: the P-value of the interaction 
of unconditional incentives and respondent characteris-
tics was > 0.05 for all characteristics and waves (not 
reported). The exception was the proportion of pupils 
in ‘modern’ schools who were under-represented in all 
three waves. (Modern schools were the smallest cate-
gory, representing only 2.8% of the wave 1 respondent 
sample.) Unconditional incentives reduced this bias by 
60%, 47% and 78% at waves 2, 3 and 4 respectively 
(P-values of the interaction of incentives and modern 
school ≤ 0.01 for t = 2, 3, 4). 
 
Since incentives had a positive effect on unit response 
and a negative effect on item response, Table 5 
documents the net effect on the amount of information 
collected in the survey. The benefits of incentives in 
terms of unit nonresponse clearly outweighed the cost 
in terms of item nonresponse. For each sample person 
issued at wave 2, the predicted unit and item response 
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rates for the postal higher achiever sample implied that 
by wave 4, 40% more valid items were collected with 
unconditional incentives compared to the control 
group. For lower achievers, 50% more information 
was collected with incentives. This is, however, a 
crude measure of the net effect of incentives, since in a 
multivariate analysis or for analyses of change, 
different patterns of missingness across items or across 
waves may lead to large numbers of cases being 
dropped by pairwise deletion.  
H2: Effects of incentives across waves. 
The effect on attrition decreased somewhat across 
waves, while the effects on item nonresponse and attri-
tion bias were constant. Incentives reduced attrition by 
38% at wave 2, 32% at wave 3 and 30% at wave 4 
(Table 2, Col 4). The effects were similar at waves 2 
and 3, but significantly different between waves 2 and 
4 and between waves 3 and 4 (P-value from a Wald 
test of the equality of 2β  across waves was ≤ 0.05). 
Although the relative effect of incentives decreased, 
the absolute effect increased across waves (-17 per-
centage points at wave 4, compared to -8 and -14 at 
waves 2 and 3, see Table 5). The effect of incentives 
on item nonresponse was not significantly different 
across waves (P-value of equality of 2β  across waves 
was  > 0.05), although the predicted numbers of miss-
ing items fell across waves. Similarly, the effects of 
incentives on attrition bias did not differ across waves.  
H3: Conditional compared to unconditional incentives. 
Unconditional incentives had a greater effect in re-
ducing attrition than conditional incentives, but similar 
effects on item nonresponse and attrition bias. For 
higher achievers, the conditional incentives used at 
wave 2 were only half as effective at reducing attrition 
as unconditional incentives (Table 2, Col 5) and the 
difference between the two conditions was significant 
(P-value from a Wald test of the equality of 2β  and 3β  
was 0.0142). At the same time, conditional incentives 
increased item nonresponse by 38% more than un-
conditional incentives (Table 3, Col 5), but the differ-
ence was not significant. Conditional incentives some-
what reduced attrition bias for a single characteristic: 
sample members in the control group studying for 
vocational qualifications at wave 1 were 6.8% more 
likely to drop out than those not studying for 
vocational qualifications. With conditional incentives 
the difference was 6.4% (P-value of the interaction of 
conditional incentives with this characteristic was 
≤ 0.05 for t = 2).   
H4: Differential effects by mode. 
Incentives had more effect on attrition and item 
nonresponse in postal than telephone mode, but no 
effect on attrition bias in either mode. In telephone 
mode, unconditional incentives had less than half the 
effect on attrition they had in postal mode for the 
higher achiever group (Table 2, Col 8). The difference 
was significant at wave 3 (P-value of the interaction 
between telephone mode and unconditional incentives 
was 0.0057) but not at wave 2. At wave 3, incentives 
increased item nonresponse 5% less in telephone mode 
than in postal mode (P-value of the interaction was 
0.0442), but the difference at wave 2 was not sig-
nificant. The lack of effect of unconditional incentives 
on attrition was no different across the two modes.  
H5: Effects of changes in mode or incentive treatment. 
Changing the incentive condition or mode did not have 
lasting effects. Changing the treatment from condi-
tional to unconditional incentives had no lasting effect 
on either attrition or item nonresponse (P > 0.05 from 
Wald tests of the equality of 2β  and 3β  for t = 3, 4) 
and the effects after the change in treatment were 
similar to those for the sample allocated to uncondi-
tional incentives from the start (Tables 2 and 3, Col 5). 
Changing the survey mode from telephone to postal 
did not have a lasting effect on attrition or item 
nonresponse either (P = value of the interaction for 
telephone mode and unconditional incentives > 0.05 at 
t = 4) and the effects after the change in mode were no 
different from the effects for the sample allocated to 
postal unconditional incentives from the start (Tables 2 
and 3, Col 8).   
H6: Differential effects by ability level. 
The effects of incentives were similar across achieve-
ment levels. Differences between achievement levels 
in the proportional effects of unconditional and condi-
tional incentives on attrition and item nonresponse, 
were not significant (Cols 6 and 7 in Tables 2 and 3 
report the P-values of the interactions of achievement 
level with each of the incentive treatments), since the 
absolute effects were comparable. Unconditional in-
centives, for example, reduced attrition at wave 2 by 8 
percentage points among higher achievers and 10 
percentage points among lower achievers. However, 
since the level of nonresponse in the control group was 
61% higher for the lower achiever group, the similar 
absolute effect implied a smaller proportional effect of 
only 76% of the effect for higher achievers. 
Similarly, the difference between modes was not dif-
ferential by achievement (Tables 2 and 3, Col 9 report 
the P-values of the interaction between achievement 
level, unconditional incentives and telephone mode) 
and the lack of effect on attrition bias was no different 
for lower achievers (not reported).  
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Table 5 Net effect of incentives on unit and item response 
 
  Predicted cumulative RR (%) Predicted mean # INR 
# valid items per unit issued at w2: 
incentive/control 
  w2 w3 w4 w2 w3 w4 w2 w3 w4 
Higher Px 78.23 57.14 43.47 2.89 2.54 1.75 - - - 
Achievers Pu 86.45 70.82 60.66 3.19 2.96 1.77 1.097 1.228 1.395 
 Pc 82.32 66.80 57.91 3.30 3.20 2.01 1.042 1.152 1.324 
 Tx 76.82 53.11 38.31 0.12 0.30 1.61 - - - 
 Tu 80.91 59.20 50.69 0.12 0.25 1.80 1.053 1.116 1.317 
Lower Px 64.93 41.14 26.89 3.49 3.52 2.54 - - - 
Achievers Pu 75.00 53.95 40.63 4.37 4.51 2.91 1.130 1.282 1.498 
 Pc 71.35 50.09 40.60 3.83 4.66 2.72 1.090 1.186 1.504 
 Tx 65.21 38.53 24.34 0.50 3.48 2.35 - - - 
 Tu 70.41 49.94 36.99 0.49 3.56 2.99 1.080 1.294 1.498 
Notes: RR = response rate, INR = item nonresponse, # = number. T = telephone, P = postal, x = control, u = unconditional incentive, 
c = conditional incentive. Calculation based on 44 non-branched items at wave 2, 48 at wave 3 and 46 at wave 4. The number of valid items 
is calculated as RR4*(44-INR2 + 48-INR3 + 46-INR4).     
Table 6 Question wording of items included in analysis of nonresponse bias 
 
Variable Question wording 
Year 11 exam results “Please tell us: a) Which GCSE subjects you studied in Years 10 and 11, b) Which GCSE subjects you have taken an exam in, 
c) Your GCSE results (do not record any re-sit results obtained in Year 11).” 
Attitudes: “Here are some things which people have said. We would like to know what you think. Please put a cross in one box for each 
statement: Agree, Disagree, Don’t know.” 
ATT: employers Agree: “Most employers don’t give young people the right king of training at work.” 
ATT: training/pay Agree: “In looking for a job, I am more concerned to find one with training than one that pays the best.” 
ATT: plans Agree: “I think that making plans for the future is a waste of time.” 
ATT: information Agree: “I know how to find out about future work, training or education opportunities.” 
ATT: support Agree: “I get enough support in planning my future.” 
Current activity: “Please put a cross against one box to tell us your main activity at the moment: a) Out of work/unemployed, b) Modern 
Apprenticeship, National Traineeship, Youth Training or other government supported training, c) In a full-time job (over 30 
hours a week), d) In a part-time job (if this is your main activity), e) In full-time education at school or college, f) Looking 
after home or family, g) Doing something else (please specify).” 
In ft education In full-time education. 
In ft employment In full-time employment. 
NEET Not in employment, education or training. 
ILO unemployed Unemployed and searching for job among economically active (YCS derived variable). 
Unemployed  Unemployed in one or more months from April 1999 to March 2000: “We would also like to know what you have been doing 
over the past months. Please put a cross in one box for each month to show us what you were doing for all, or most of each 
month”. 
Response options as for current activity, including ‘On holiday’.  
Studying (ac) Yes: “At present, are you studying for GCSE, A/S or A-level qualifications?” 
Studying (voc) Yes: “At present, are you studying for any GNVQs (General National Vocational Qualifications)?” or “At present, are you 
studying for NVQ (National Vocational Qualification) or any other vocational or professional qualification including BTEC, 
City & Guilds or RSA qualifications?” 
Household: “Who lives in the same household as you? a) Father, b) Stepfather, c) Mother, d) Stepmother, e) Your own children,  
f) Brothers and sisters g) Other persons (please write in their relationship to you).” 
Living with parent Living with one or more of father, stepfather, mother or stepmother. 
Living with partner Living with boyfriend, girlfriend, husband, wife or partner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Summary and discussion 
 
This study has provided new evidence on the effects of 
continued incentive payments in a multi-mode panel study. 
We tested the effects of incentives on attrition, item 
nonresponse and attrition bias and whether these effects 
changed across waves. We also tested whether conditional 
and unconditional incentives had similar effects, whether 
incentive effects were differential across modes and ability 
levels, and whether changes in the incentive treatment or 
mode had lasting impact on the effect of incentives in 
subsequent waves.  
The findings showed that unconditional incentives 
significantly reduced attrition and, although they also 
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increased item nonresponse, the net effect on the amount of 
information collected by the survey was positive. Incentives 
had proportionate effects across a range of respondent 
characteristics and as a result did not impact on attrition bias 
in terms of those characteristics. Item nonresponse increased 
more with unconditional than conditional incentives, and 
more in postal than in telephone mode. Attrition bias was 
not affected by either incentive treatment in either mode. 
Across waves, incentives had a somewhat decreasing effect 
on attrition, but similar effects on item nonresponse. The 
lack of effect on attrition bias was also a constant across 
waves. Changes in incentive treatment from conditional to 
unconditional, and in mode from telephone to postal, did not 
affect outcomes at later waves.  
The findings imply that respondent incentives are an 
effective means of maintaining sample sizes of a panel and 
ensuring its value in terms of efficiency of estimation and 
feasibility of subgroup analyses. Among lower achievers, 
fully 50% more information was collected during the three 
experimental waves, in terms of the number of valid items 
per case issued at the start. Incentives were safe, in the sense 
that increased response rates did not inadvertently increase 
nonresponse bias in terms of observed characteristics.  
Changes in incentive treatment did not have lasting 
effect; however, in this study the only change implemented 
was an improvement for the respondent, from conditional to 
unconditional incentives. Expectations formed on the basis 
of previous incentive treatments may well mean that 
changes have lasting effect, if the change reduces the value 
of the incentive in the eyes of the respondent (see, Singer, 
Van Hoewyk and Maher 1998).  
Incentives had no effect on attrition bias. We could 
however not evaluate the effect on bias of nonresponse at 
wave 1. Ideally, we would assess both the magnitude of bias 
due to nonresponse at wave 1 and due to subsequent 
attrition, and the effects of incentives on both. It is possible 
that nonresponse at wave 1 is more detrimental in terms of 
bias than later attrition, especially in studies such as the 
present one with low initial response rates. In this case, the 
effect of incentives on bias at wave 1 may be more 
important than any effect on bias caused by attrition. In 
addition, the discussion of the effects of incentives on 
attrition bias has focused entirely on observed 
characteristics and although incentives did not have 
differential effects in terms of these, they may nonetheless 
have differential effects in terms of unobserved factors. If 
this were the case, the use of respondent incentives could 
introduce sample selection bias in multivariate estimates, if 
the unobservables determining the responsiveness to 
incentives are correlated with outcomes measured by the 
survey (Kennedy 2003). For example, if responsiveness to 
incentives depends on time preferences for money and this 
factor also determines the decision to leave further 
education and work instead, then models of the 
determinants of educational outcomes will lead to biased 
estimates.  
Finally, there was little evidence that the respondent 
sample became less sensitive to incentives across waves as 
potentially less committed sample members dropped out. 
This finding is consistent with Laurie (2007), who reported 
that an increase in the value of an incentive in the British 
Household Panel Survey significantly increased response, 
even after 14 waves of the panel, with already high annual 
response rates of around 95% each year. Since previous 
studies have found that the effects of one-off incentives can 
carry over across waves (James 1997; Laurie and Lynn in 
press; Mack et al. 1998), a formal test of marginal effects of 
incentives would however require comparisons with a 
treatment group only offered an incentive at the first wave. 
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